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Abstract
We dene and study periodic strategies in two player nite strategic form games.
This concept can arise from some epistemic analysis of the rationalizability concept
of Bernheim and Pearce. We analyze in detail the pure strategies and mixed strate-
gies cases. In the pure strategies case, we prove that every two player nite action
game has at least one periodic strategy, making the periodic strategies an inherent
characteristic of these games. Applying the algorithm of periodic strategies in the
case where mixed strategies are used, we nd some very interesting outcomes with
useful quantitative features for some classes of games. Particularly interesting are
the implications of the algorithm to collective action games, for which we were able
to establish the result that the collective action strategy can be incorporated in
a purely non-cooperative context. Moreover, we address the periodicity issue for
the case the players have a continuum set of strategies available. We also discuss
whether periodic strategies can imply any sort of cooperativity. In addition, we
put the periodic strategies in an epistemic framework.
Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory [1,2] has been one of the most valuable tools in strategic
decision making and social sciences for the last 60 years. Research in game theory is
devoted to studying strategic interaction within a group of strategic decision makers,
for which the outcomes are strongly interdependent. The term non-cooperative refers
to situations where the opposing players of the game are trying to obtain the best out-
comes for themselves, but their outcomes depend on the choices their opponents make.
This is what distinguishes game theory from problems of single agent decision theory.
One of the most important and probably most controversial principle that game theory
voiko@physics.auth.gr, Vasilis.Oikonomou@mis.mpg.de
yjost@mis.mpg.de
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is founded upon is the concept of rationality of the players and the common belief in ra-
tionality of the players that participate in the game. An individual is rational if he has
well dened preferences over the whole set of possible outcomes and deploys the best
available strategy to achieve these outcomes. To put it dierently, rationality means
that each player forms beliefs about his own and his opponent's possible strategies,
beliefs in terms of subjective probabilities and acts according to those probabilities.
By "act" we mean an optimal strategy based on the beliefs of the player for his oppo-
nent's strategies. We shall assume that every player acts rationally, that is, optimally
according to his beliefs about his opponents and also that all players believe in their
opponent's rationality. In addition, a very important underlying theme in game the-
oretic frameworks is the concept of common knowledge [3]. An event or an outcome
or an information is common knowledge if all the players know it and additionally
if every player knows that every players knows it etc. So the game and rationality
of the players are assumed to be common knowledge. The outcomes of a game can
be of various types but we shall conne ourselves to outcomes that are described in
terms of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function [4]. So optimality for players
actions is conceptually and quantitatively identical to utility maximization for players.
Among the various types of games, we shall conne ourselves to two player strategic
form games with complete information that are played simultaneously and only for one
time. A strategic game consists of the following three elements, namely, a nite set
of players, a set of actions that each player can play, and a utility function for each
player. The utility functions quantify each player's preferences over the various action
proles. Strategic form games are arguably the most fundamental ingredient in game
theory since even extensive games can be reduced in strategic form games. With the
term complete information is meant that all players have perfect information about
the elements of the game, that is, for the players of the game, their utility functions,
the set of actions, and also that no player has private information that others do not
know. Furthermore, all players know that all players know everything about the game.
Moreover, no uncertainty is implied about the payo functions and also for the number
of the available actions for each player.
One of the most fundamental concepts in non-cooperative game theory is the Nash
equilibrium, which is one of the most widely and commonly used solution concepts
that predict the outcome of a strategic interaction in the social sciences. A pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium is an action prole with the important property that no
single player can obtain a higher payo by deviating unilaterally from this strategy
prole. Based on the rationality of the players, a Nash strategy is a steady state of
strategic interaction. However, as Bernheim notes in his paper [5], Nash equilibrium is
neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition.
Despite the valuable contributions that the Nash equilibrium oers to non-cooperative
games, there is a very rigorous renement, the rationalizability solution concept and
rationalizable strategies [8{24]. In strategic form games, rationalizability is based on
the fact that each player views his opponent's choices as uncertain events, each player
complies to Savage's axioms of rationality and this fact is common knowledge [5]. The
rationalizability concept appeared independently in Bernheim's [5] and Pearce's work [6]
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(a predecessor of the two papers was Myerson's work [7]). From then, a great amount
of work was done towards further studying and rening the rationalizability solution
concept in various games, both static and dynamic. For an important stream of papers
see [8{24] and references therein.
The Nash equilibrium and its renements are statements about the existence of a xed
point in every game. In this paper we shall present another mathematical property
of two player simultaneous strategic form games, which we shall call periodicity. In
general, periodicity is not a solution concept, but in certain cases it is, with interesting
quantitative implications.
The purpose of this paper is to study periodic strategies and investigate the conse-
quences of periodicity in various cases of two player perfect information strategic form
games. With the terms \periodic" and \periodicity" is meant that there exist maps
between the two players' strategy spaces, such that they constitute an automorphism
on each strategy space Q, which has the property Qn = 1 for some n 2 N . The period-
icity concept appeared in Bernheim's paper [5] in a dierent context and not under that
name. It actually appeared as being a property of rationalizable strategies. In our case,
the periodicity of a strategy can easily be investigated by using an algorithm we shall
present. Using this algorithm, at rst we shall prove that periodic strategies exist in ev-
ery nite action two player strategic form game with pure strategies, and some of these
are rationalizable too. In addition, we shall prove that the set of periodic strategies is
set stable. We shall investigate which conditions have to be satised, in order that a
Nash equilibrium is periodic. After providing some illuminating examples, we turn our
focus on two player strategic games with mixed strategies. In this case, we shall see that
the only strategy that satises the algorithm and thus is periodic in the strict sense, is
the mixed Nash equilibrium. After that, we shall present the consequences of the algo-
rithm when it is applied to games with mixed strategies. The results are particularly
interesting quantitatively and qualitatively, for some classes of games, as we shall see.
In particular, we shall establish the result that when someone uses the algorithm, he
can get exactly the same payo as the Mixed Nash equilibrium yields. This payo does
not depend on what the opponents of a player play and thus is completely dierent
in spirit from the mixed Nash equilibrium, in which case the Nash strategy is optimal
only in the case the opponent plays mixed Nash. Applying the algorithm in collective
action games we found an elegant way to explain why the social optimum strategy is
actually a strategy that can be chosen assuming non-cooperativity. A discussion on
the dierence of periodicity and cooperativity follows. As we shall demonstrate, the
periodic strategies are as cooperative as the Nash equilibrium is. We establish this
result quantitatively by exploiting a characteristic example and computing explicitly
the payos in each case. The case when the two players have a continuum set of actions
available is also studied. Moreover, we shall attempt to put the periodic strategies into
an epistemic game theory framework. As we shall demonstrate, the periodicity number
is connected to the number of types needed to describe the game.
Perhaps, our concept of periodicity is best claried in epistemic terms. The reasoning
behind the Nash equilibrium concept is essentially the following: I play the equilibrium
because if I deviated, my opponent could respond with an action that leaves him better
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o, but which is worse for me. The additional step of considering the possibility that
I might respond to his new action with still another one that would be better for me,
but worse for him, however, is not taken. In that sense, the requirement is that the
reasoning of the players has to be consistent at equilibrium, but not necessarily o
equilibrium. The rationalizability concept of Bernheim [5] and Pearce [6] somehow
avoids this issue and instead argues that I choose an action because this is a best
response to an action that I believe my opponent will take, and I believe that he will
choose that action because he believes that I shall play some, possibly dierent, action
to which his action is a best response, and that putative action of mine in turn is caused
by a belief of mine that he will choose another, possibly dierent, action to which that
action of mine is a best response, and so on. That, is the choice of action is justied at
every step of the belief hierarchy in terms of a best response to a putative action of the
other player. Now, our periodicity concept could be described by a similar iteration.
I play a particular action because I hope that my opponent will play an action most
favorable to me, and he will in turn play that action because he hopes that I shall
play an action most favorable for him, and so on again. As for rationalizability, the
innite iteration makes this solution concept consistent. And we can then study the
relationship between this solution concept and the others mentioned, and in particular,
for which classes of games periodicity includes mixed Nash or rationalizability and when
it leads to dierent outcomes.
Starting from a dierent perspective, Kabalak and Kell [35] have arrived at some re-
sults that overlap with those of the present paper, in particular for certain games like
Prisoner's Dilemma.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 1, we dene the periodic strategies and
present the algorithm of periodic strategies, in the case of pure strategies. In addition
we prove the set stability and provide some examples. In section 2, we study the mixed
strategies case. In section 3, we investigate the consequences of the periodic strategies
algorithm for some classes of games. Moreover, the collective action games are studied
and also the issue of the dierence between periodicity and cooperativity is addressed
too. In section 4, we study the continuous strategy space case of two player strategic
form games while in section 5 we incorporate the periodicity concept in an epistemic
game theory framework by connecting types to the periodicity number.
1 Periodic Strategies in Strategic Form Games{Denitions{
Pure Strategies Case
We restrict our present study to simultaneous, strategic form games with two players
A and B, in the context of perfect information, assuming that the game is played only
once. The actions available to each player are considered to be nite in number, and
also only pure strategies are used as a rst approach. Each player can have a nite
number of actions, but the actions of the two players can be dierent in number. Denote
with M(A) the strategy space of all A's actions and with N (B) the strategy space of
all B's actions. The strategic form game is then dened as:
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 The set of players: I = 1; 2
 The strategy spaces of players A;B, namely M(A) and N (B), and the total
strategy space G =M(A)N (B)
 The payo functions Ui( G) : G! <, i = 1; 2
We dene two continuous maps, '1 and '2, between the strategy spaces M(A) and
N (B), which act as follows:
'1 :M(A)! N (B) '2 : N (B)!M(A) (1)
With the payo being dened as:
Ui :M(A)N (B)! < (2)
the actions of the aforementioned maps '1;2 are dened in such a way that the following
inequalities hold true at each step:
U1(x; '1(x)) > U1(x; y1) 8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1(x)g (3)
U2('2  '1(x); '1(x)) > U2(x1; '1(x)) 8x1 2 M(A)nf'2  '1(x)g
U1('2  '1(x); '1  '2  '1(x)) > U1('2  '1(x); y1)8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1  '2  '1(x)g
...
U2(('2  '1)n(x); '1  ('2  '1)n 1(x)) > U2(x1; '1  ('2  '1)n 1(x))8 x1
2 M(A)nf('2  '1)n(x)g
U1(('2  '1)n(x); '1  ('2  '1)n(x)) > U1(('2  '1)nx; y1)
8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1  ('2  '1)n(x)g
with n some positive integer. Let us clarify the meaning of the above inequalities. We
start with a pure strategy x 2 M(A), upon which we act with the map '1. The map
acts in such a way that the inequality U1(x; '1(x)) > U1(x; y1) 8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1(x)g
holds true. What this means is that '1 maps x to B's strategy space such that this
action of B's yields the highest payo for player A playing the action x. At the next
step, the map '2 acts on the strategy space of player B and yields an action '2 '1(x)
2 M(A) such that U2('2  '1(x); '1(x)) > U2(x1; '1(x))8x1 2 M(A)nf'2  '1(x)g.
So we could say that '2 '1(x) is an action of player A for which the utility function of
player B is maximized, if it is assumed that player B plays '1(x). If we proceed in this
way, under some assumptions that we will shortly address, it is possible to end up to
the initial action x of player A. We can depict this procedure with an one dimensional
chain of strategies, as follows:
x
P ! '1(x) P ! '2  '1(x) P !    P ! x (4)
where with the letter P we denote the procedure described in relation (3).
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Therefore it is possible to construct a chain of actions corresponding to the maps '1;2
so that the nal action of the chain is identical to the action at the beginning of the
chain. We shall call that action periodic. Notice that for periodic actions, the operator
Q dened as,
Q = '2  '1 (5)
has the property that Qnx = x for some number n 2 N , if the action x is periodic. In
terms of the operator Q, the last inequality of relation (3) can be cast as:
U1(Qn(x); '1  Qn(x)) > U1(Qn(x); y1)8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1  ('2  '1)n(x)g (6)
The periodicity property is a very important property of the space of actions of player
A. It means that we can nd an operator that acts as an automorphism on a subset of
M(A) and leaves every element of this subset invariant under this map. To be specic,
when it acts on an action that belongs to the set of periodic actions, then it can yield
the original action, after a nite number of steps. It is exactly this subset of the total
strategy space of player A that constitutes the set of periodic strategies of player A. We
denote the set of periodic actions of player A as P(A) and correspondingly the players
B, as P(B). We can formally dene the periodic strategies as follows:
Denition 1 (Periodicity). In a 2-player simultaneous move strategic form game with
nite actions, we dene periodic strategies for player A to be a subset which we denote
P(A), of his available strategiesM(A), such that there exists an operator Q: M(A)!
M(A), such that 9 a number ni 2 N for which 8 xi 2 P(A), the operator satises
Qnixi = xi. It is presupposed that the map consists of maps that act in such a way
that the inequalities of relation (3) are fullled. We call the number \ni", periodicity
number and is characteristic to every periodic strategy of the game.
Obviously, similar denitions can be given for player B. We denote the operator corre-
sponding to player B Q0, and can be constructed from the maps '1; '2 as follows,
Q0 = '1  '2 (7)
In this case, the inequalities (3) take the form:
U2(y; '2(y)) > U2(y; x1) 8x1 2 M(A)nf'2(y)g (8)
U1('1  '2(y); '2(x)) > U1(y1; '2(y))8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1  '2(y)g
U2('1  '2(y); '2  '1  '2(y)) > U2('1  '2(y); x1)8 x1 2 M(A)nf'2  '1  '2(y)g
...
U1(('1  '2)n(y); '2  ('1  '2)n 1(y)) > U2(y1; '2  ('1  '2)n 1(y))
8 y1 2 N (B)nf'1  '2)n(y)g
U2(('1  '2)n(y); '2  ('1  '2)n(y)) > U2(('1  '2)n(y); x1)
8 x1 2 M(A)nf'2  ('1  '2)n(y)g
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The last inequality can be written in terms of the operator Q0, as:
U2(Q0n(y); '2  Q0n(y)) > U2(Q0n(y); x1)8 x1 2 M(A)nf'2  Q0n(y)g (9)
There is a clear conceptual distinction between periodic strategies and rationalizable
strategies, however the rationalizable strategies that are also periodic are particularly
interesting. We will make this clear with some characteristic examples that we analyze
in detail at the end of this section. The procedure described by relations (3) and
(8) does not suggest in any way that the resulting actions under the maps '1 and
'2 are best responses to some action. This is an important distinction between, the
algorithm that the inequalities (3) and (8) suggest, and the procedure of nding the
best responses for each player. Because this is important, we shall shed some light in
this concept. Take for example the rst of the inequalities (3). The underlying meaning
is that, assuming that player A plays x, we search in the action set of player B the
action '1(x) for which the utility of player A, U1(:; :) is maximized. This is exactly the
converse of the procedure followed when best responses are studied. Indeed, in the best
response algorithm we don't presuppose that player A will play some action, but we
ask, given that player B will play an action, say bk, which action of player A maximizes
his utility function U1(:; :). Let us briey recapitulate what we just described. In the
best response algorithm, we are searching player's A set of actions but in the periodic
actions algorithm described by the inequalities (3), we search the set of players B action,
given that A plays a specic action. The last procedure is somewhat articial in the
game, since what we are interested for, is whether an action is periodic and not for
example if this action is rationalizable.
We have to say that, in regard to the number \n", which is the periodicity number
dened previously, it seems that it depends strongly on the payo details of the game,
but it does not depend on the number of actions. Thereby, there is no direct connection
of this number, to the number of actions and the number of players, at least for nite
two player strategic form games. As we will demonstrate, this holds true even in the
case of games with continuous set of actions available for each player.
Periodic strategies are very inherent to every nite action strategic form game. Indeed,
the following theorem exactly describes that:
Theorem 1. Every nite action simultaneous 2-player strategic form game contains
at least one periodic action.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is very easy since the inequalities (3) hold true. We
focus on player A, but the results are true for player B too. Let us start from an action
x which is assumed to be non-periodic. If we apply on x, the operator Q, so that the
inequalities (3) are satised at every step, then since the game contains a nite number
of actions, there will be an action xa for which there exist a nite number n, so that
Qnxa = xa. Hence the chain of actions that satisfy inequalities (3) is as follows:
x1
P ! Qmx1 P ! xa P ! Qxa : : : P ! Qn 1xa P ! xa (10)
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If the above is not true for any other action apart from xa, then since the game contains
a nite number of actions, this would imply that xa is periodic. So every nite action
game contains at least one periodic action.
The reasoning we adopted in order to prove the theorem reveals another property of
the set of periodic actions in nite action games. Actually, recall the denition of set
stable strategies from Bernheim [5]. We modify the denition of set stability as follows:
Denition 2 (Set Stability). Let Q be an automorphism Q : M(A) ! M(A). In
addition, let A  A [ B  M(A), with A \ B = ?. The set A is set stable under
the action of the map Q if, for any initial x0 2 A [B and any sequence xk formed by
taking xk+1 2 Q(xk), there exists xK 2 A [ B such that d(xK ; x1) < , with x1 2 A.
For nite sets, this implies that any sequence formed by the act of the operator Q on
elements produces an xk for any initial x0, with xk belonging to the set stable set A.
Obviously, a similar denition as the above holds for the set of actions of player B, but
this time for the operator Q0 : N (B)! N (B).
Theorem 2. Let P(A) and P(B) denote the set of periodic strategies for players 1 and
2 respectively. The sets P(A) and P(B) are set stable, under the action of the maps Q
and Q0 respectively.
Plainly spoken, the theorem implies that the periodicity cycle of any non-periodic action
x0 results in the periodicity cycle of some action xK , that is:
x0
P ! Q(x0) P ! Q2(x0) P !   xK P ! QxK P !    P ! Qn 1xK P ! xK (11)
Proof. The proof of this theorem is contained in the proof of Theorem 1, so we omit
it.
1.1 Rationalizable Strategies
1.1.1 Nash Strategies
We now turn our focus on the Nash strategies that are at the same time periodic
actions. Suppose that the strategy set (x; y) constitutes one of the Nash equilibria
of a two player nite action simultaneous move game. Then the actions (x; y) are
mutually best responses for the two players. In order a Nash strategy is a periodic
strategy, the following two conditions must hold true, which can be contained in the
following theorem:
Theorem 3. In a 2-player nite action, simultaneous, strategic form game, a Nash
strategy (x; y) of a game is periodic if
'1(x
) = y (12)
'2(y
) = x
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with '1,'2 dened in such a way that the inequalities (3), (8) hold true. In addition,
the periodicity number for each action is equal to one, that is n = 1 and,
Q(x) = x (13)
Q0(y) = y
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is simple, but we must bear in mind that the maps '1;2
do not give in general the best response sets of the players involved in a game. Suppose
that for the Nash strategy (x; y), the relations (12) hold true. Acting on the rst
with the map '2 on the left, and with '1 on the second relation, again on the left, we
get the relations:
'2  '1(x) = '2(y) (14)
'1  '2(y) = '1(x)
Using relations (12), the equations (14) become:
2  1(x) = x (15)
1  2(y) = y
Hence the Nash actions (x; y) are periodic. The relations (15) can be cast in terms
of the operators Q and Q0 as,
Q(x) = x (16)
Q0(y) = y
It is obvious that the periodicity number for the two actions is equal to one, namely
n = 1.
1.1.2 Periodic Rationalizable Strategies
The situation when a rationalizable strategy is also periodic is particularly interesting.
This can be true if the rationalizability chain is identical to the periodicity cycle. In
particular, if the rationalizability chains of belief contain actions that satisfy at every
step the inequalities (3) and (8). Hence, applying the algorithm at every nite game
we may also identify the possible rationalizable strategies, in a quick and simple way.
Of course, one should thoroughly study the game in order to nd all the rationalizable
strategies, but our algorithm actually tells which strategies are probably rationalizable.
We shall exploit the fact that, for periodic rationalizable strategies, the periodicity
chains coincide with the rationalizability cycle in a later section, where we shall develop
some epistemic reasoning.
1.2 Some Examples
In order to support the results that we presented in the previous sections, we shall
exploit some characteristic examples of nite strategic form games with two players.
All the games are considered to be simultaneous and are played only for one time.
9
1.2.1 Games with and without Periodic Nash Equilibria-Four Choices two
Player Games
We start rst with Game 1A, which is an analog of one of the games Bernheim used in
his original rationalizability paper [5]. We shall focus our interest on player's A choices,
but similar results hold for player's B actions. Using the algorithm that the inequalities
of relation (3) dictate, we can construct the following periodicity cycles, namely:
a1
P ! b3 P ! a3 P ! b1 P ! a1 (17)
a3
P ! b1 P ! a1 P ! b3 P ! a3
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 0,7 2,5 7,0 0,1
a2 5,2 3,3 5,2 0,1
a3 7,0 2,5 0,7 0,1
a4 0,0 0,-2 0,0 10,-1
Table 1: Game 1A
It is obvious that the periodicity number is n = 2 for both the actions, a1 and a3.
Moreover, for the actions that constitute a Nash equilibrium it is not possible to con-
struct such a cycle. Nevertheless, if we apply the algorithm (3), we obtain the following
cycle:
a2
P ! b1 P ! a1 P ! b3 P ! a3 P ! b1 P ! a1 (18)
It is obvious that the cycle of the non-periodic Nash action a2 ends up to the periodic
cycle of the periodic action a1. This is the materialization of the Theorem 2, which
states that the set of periodic actions is set stable under the operator Q. Now we focus
our study to the rationalizability cycles. The actions a1 and a3 are both rationalizable.
These two actions are both rationalizable and periodic, and moreover, the rationaliz-
b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 0,7 2,5 7,0 0,1
a2 5,2 7,7 5,2 0,1
a3 7,0 2,5 0,7 0,1
a4 0,0 0,-2 0,0 10,-1
Table 2: Game 1B
ability cycles for these two, coincide with the periodicity cycles. By rationalizability
cycle is meant a cycle based on rationality and by rationality is meant acting optimally
under some beliefs about the opponents actions. Indeed, such a cycle exists and it looks
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like:
a1
R ! b3 R ! a3 R ! b1 R ! a1 (19)
a3
R ! b1 R ! a1 R ! b3 R ! a3
The reasoning behind this cycle is based on this system of beliefs: Player A considers
action a1 rational if he believes that player B will play b3, which is rational for player
B if he believes that player A will play a3. Accordingly, A will consider playing a3
rational if he believes that player B will play b1, which would be rational for player B if
he believes that player A will play a1. Therefore, we obtain a cycle of rationalizability
based on pure utility maximization rationality. For the Nash action a2 it is not easy to
construct such a cycle because A will be forced to play a2 since B would never play b1
or b3 as a best response to a2. So, the Nash strategy is \forced\ to be rationalizable.
In this game, the non-Nash rationalizable actions are periodic actions which actually
are the only periodic strategies and also the rationality cycles and periodicity cycles
coincide.
We now slightly modify Game 1A and we construct Game 1B. The dierence is that
the Nash equilibrium payos are changed. In this case, the periodicity cycles of the
actions a1 and a3 remain intact, but in this case, the Nash action a2 is also periodic,
with periodicity cycle:
a2
R ! b2 R ! a2 (20)
Again, the periodicity and rationalizability cycles for the Nash action a2 coincide.
1.2.2 2 2 Games
Now we focus our interest on 2  2 simultaneous strategic form games. Consider rst
Game 2. We examine which of the actions are periodic, which rationalizable and which
b1 b2
a1 3,5 0,2
a2 4,3 5,4
Table 3: Game 2
both. First of all, the Nash equilibrium consists of the actions (a2; b2). Following the
reasoning of relation (3), we can construct the following periodicity cycles:
a1
P ! b1 P ! a1 (21)
a2
P ! b2 P ! a2
Obviously, all actions have a periodicity cycle and additionally all the periodicity num-
bers are equal to one in this particular game. Note that the actions that enter the
Nash equilibrium are also periodic. However, the action a1 is strictly dominated by the
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action a2 for all cases, so it is not rationalizable. So we can never construct a cycle
based on rationality argument for this action. Indeed, player A would never consider
the action a1 to be a rational move because it is never a best response. Nevertheless, we
can construct a cycle based on rationality arguments for the a2 action. Indeed, player
A would consider a2 to be a rational move if he believed that player B would play b2,
which would be rational for player B if he believes that player A plays a2. According
to this line of reasoning we can construct the rationalizability cycles:
a2
R ! b2 R ! a2 (22)
with the superscript R over the arrows expressing the rationalizability arguments we
have just presented. In this particular game, the set of periodic actions for player A
consists of both actions a1 and a2, that is P(A) = fa1; a2g, while the set of rationalizable
actions that are not Nash actions is empty. The set of Nash actions consists of the
action fa2g. This particular example is one where the Nash equilibrium happens to
be periodic. In addition, this game is very useful for economic applications. Indeed,
the iterated elimination of dominated strategies results to (a2; b2) which is the Nash
equilibrium. This class of games describes competition between two rms that choose
quantities that they produce, knowing that the total quantity that is put in the market
actually determines the price [31]. It is very interesting that a periodic Nash equilibrium
in the above game, is the only action that remains after the iterated elimination of
dominated strategies.
1.2.3 Some Very Well Studied Examples
Before closing this section, we study the periodicity properties of the players available
actions in the context of some very well known games, namely, the prisoner's dilemma
game, the battle of sexes game and nally the matching pennies game. Let us start
with the prisoner's dilemma game. In the general case, this looks Game 3, with the
b1 b2
a1 b,b d,a
a2 a,d c,c
Table 4: Game 3, Prisoner's Dilemma
numbers a; b; c; d satisfying a < b < c < d. Now it is easy to prove that the action a1
is rationalizable but not periodic. It is obvious that the action a2 is periodic and the
strategy (a2; b2) contains periodic actions. Actually, the periodicity cycle in this case
looks like:
a2
P ! b2 P ! a1 P ! b1 P ! a2 (23)
Clearly n = 2 in this case. Let us continue with the Battle of Sexes game. For example
this game can take the form of Game 4. In this game, there are two Nash equilibria,
namely (a1; b1) and (a2; b2) and both actions a1 and a2 are periodic and rationalizable.
There are no non-Nash strategies that are rationalizable. In this game, we always
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b1 b2
a1 2,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,2
Table 5: Game 4, Battle of Sexes
have n = 1, as can be easily checked. Finally, let us present the matching pennies
game, Game 5. It is an easy task to verify that n = 2 in this game and also that
b1 b2
a1 1,-1 -1,1
a2 -1,1 1,-1
Table 6: Game 5, The Matching Pennies Game
the actions a1; a2 are both periodic and rationalizable, that is, we can construct the
following cycles:
a1
P ! b1 P ! a2 P ! b2 P ! a1 (24)
a2
R ! b2 R ! a1 R ! b1 R ! a2
Therefore, all the actions of player A are periodic (the same hold for player B's actions).
Obviously, both actions are rationalizable. This game is of particular importance, since
there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Hence, this acts as a compelling motivation
to try to generalize the algorithm of relation (3) that takes into account pure strategies,
to the case where mixed strategies are employed from the two players. This will be the
subject of the next section.
1.3 Perfect-Information Extensive-Form Games
Before closing this section, let us briey comment on the case of extensive form games
and periodicity. Since every perfect information extensive form game has a strategic
form game representative, then all the previous apply to extensive form games. The
dierence is that the strategic form representative of an extensive form game has many
degeneracies, so we may have many periodicity cycles corresponding to a specic action.
But we omit for brevity this study since in general all the previous apply.
2 Periodicity, Rationalizability and Mixed Strategies in
Finite Action Simultaneous Strategic Form Games
2.1 The Algorithm in the Case of Mixed Strategies
In this section, we study periodic strategies, in the case in which mixed strategies are
deployed in the simultaneous strategic form game. We shall conne ourselves to 2 2
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games for simplicity and in order to be as illustrative as possible. We introduce at rst
some notation, in order to generalize the pure strategy case. Let the functions a1(Ai)
and a2(Bi), i = 1; 2 denote the player's A and player's B probabilities of playing Ai and
Bj respectively. These probabilities constitute the mixed strategies of the two players.
These probabilities are maps between the strategy space and the corresponding space
of all probability distributions of each player. These are of the form:
a1 :M(A)! (M(A)); a2 : N (B)! (N (B)) (25)
Correspondingly, the pure strategy utility function of each player is replaced by the
compound lottery of each player's preferences of his own and his opponents strategies,
which is the expected utility for the players A and B . The expected utility is dened
to be:
Uip;q(a1; a2) =
2X
i;j=1
a1(Ai)a2(Bj)Ui(Ai; Bj) (26)
with i; j = 1; 2. For later convenience, we adopt the following notation, corresponding
to 2 2 games:
a1(A1) = p; a1(A2) = 1  p (27)
a2(B1) = q; a2(B2) = 1  q
Hence, a general mixed strategy x for player A can be written as:
x = pA1 + (1  p)A2 (28)
and correspondingly an action y of player B:
y = qB1 + (1  q)B2 (29)
Note that p and q can vary in a continuous way, and the corresponding expected utility
for each player is considered to be a dierentiable function of p; q, with 0  p; q  1.
We focus our interest to the question if a periodicity pattern underlies the 2 2 games
in the context of mixed strategies. As in the pure strategy case, this periodicity will
be materialized in terms of two maps 1, 2 that constitute the automorphisms Q =
2 1 and Q0 = 1 2. In this case, the aforementioned maps are dened dierently,
in reference to the pure strategy case. Take for example player A: The operator Q
has the property that there exists a positive integer \n" and some action 2 (M(A)),
namely x, for which Qnx = x, for some positive integer \n". The actions of the
maps 1 and 2 are dened in the mixed strategies case as:
1 : (M(A))! (N (B)) (30)
2 : (N (B))! (M(A))
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These two maps are dened in such a way so at each step the following inequalities
hold true:
U1p;q(x;1(x)) > U1p;q(x; y1) 8 y1 2 (N (B)nf1(x)g) (31)
U2p;q(2  1(x);1(x)) > U2p;q(x1 ;1(x))8x1 2 (M(A)nf2  1(x)g)
U1p;q(2  1(x);1  2  1(x)) > U1p;q(2  1(x); y1)8 y1
2 (N (B)nf1  2  1(x)g)
...
U2p;q((2  1)n(x);1  (2  1)n 1(x)) > U2p;q(x1 ;1  (2  1)n 1(x))
8 x1 2 (M(A)nf(2  1)n(x)g)
U1p;q((2  1)n(x);1  (2  1)n(x)) > U1p;q((2  1)nx; y1)8 y1
2 (N (B)nf1  (2  1)n(x)g)
when we consider player A. In the above inequalities \n" is some positive integer n  1.
Let us interpret the meaning of the above inequalities, keeping in the back of our mind
that the actions now are mixed strategies. The algorithm implied by the inequalities
(31) dictates that starting with a mixed strategy of player A, namely x, and upon
which we act with the map 1, we search in player's B set of probability distributions
(N (B)), in order to nd which mixed strategy maximizes the expected utility of
player A.
At the next step (inequality 2), the map 2 acts on the strategy space of player B and
yields a mixed strategy 2  1(x) 2 M(A) such that U2p;q(2  1(x);1(x)) >
U2p;q(x1 ;1(x)) 8x1 2 

M(A)nf21(x)g)

. So, we could say that 21(x)
is a mixed strategy of player A for which the expected utility function of player B is
maximized, if it is assumed that player B plays 1(x). Accordingly, just like in the
pure strategy case, it is possible that the whole process ends up to the initial mixed
strategy, x. Therefore, it is possible to form a chain of mixed strategies of the following
form:
x
P ! 1(x) P ! 2  1(x) P !    P ! x (32)
where as in the pure strategy case, the letter P denotes the procedure described in
relation (31) above. The mixed strategies for which we can nd such a chain, we call
periodic, and as in the pure strategy case, these are formally dened to be strategies
that satisfy:
Qnx = x (33)
It is obvious that in terms of the operator Q, the last inequality of relation (31) can be
cast as:
U1p;q(Qn(x);1  Qn(x)) > U1p;q(Qn(x); y1)8 y1 2 

N (B)nf1  Qn(x)g)

(34)
The fact that we deal with mixed strategies is a great advantage since, the action of
the map 1 on x is equivalent to the maximization of U1p;q with respect to q. Indeed,
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take for example the rst inequality of relation (31). The map 1 yields a strategy 2
(N(B)), which is such that the expected utility of player A is maximized. Hence, if
we dierentiate U1p;q with respect to q, the corresponding solution, say p1 is equal to
1(x), that is:
q1 = 1(x) (35)
At this point we need to clarify some issues, in reference to mixed strategies. When
mixed strategies are deployed, in order to nd the periodic strategy for player A for
example, we dierentiate his expected utility with respect to q. Notice that, since the
expected utility is a linear function of the variables (p; q), dierentiation with respect to
q will yield a solution p1, and consequently player A determines a strategy that belongs
to his strategic choices. Similar arguments hold for player B. This behavior occurs only
in the mixed strategies case of nite strategic form games due to the linearity of the
expected utilities with respect to their variables (p; q). As can be easily inferred, this
procedure is in the antipode of the mixed Nash equilibrium calculation. In the latter,
the dierentiation of the expected utility of player A for example, with respect to p,
yield a strategy qN of the opponent, and this qualies as the Nash solution. If player
B plays his Nash solution, all actions of player A are rationalizable and actually they
are equivalent, since they yield the same payo. In the periodic strategies case, the
periodicity algorithm species an action for player A. As we shall see in the quadratic
games section, this kind of behavior does not occur when similar considerations are
used for the quadratic games.
We shall use the property implied by relation (35) in one of the next subsections and
it will bring about interesting features in some class of games. Of course the same as
above apply for player B. Thereby, the corresponding inequalities (31) for a given initial
mixed strategy y 2 (M(A)), now become:
U2p;q(y;2(y)) > U2p;q(y; x1) 8x1 2 (M(A))nf2(y)g (36)
U1p;q(1  2(y);2(x)) > U1p;q(y1 ;2(y))8 y1 2 (N (B))nf1  2(y)g
U2p;q(1  2(y);2  1  2(y)) > U2p;q(1  2(y); x1)
8 x1 2 (M(A))nf2  1  2(y)g
...
U1p;q((1  2)n(y);2  (1  2)n 1(y)) > U1p;q(y1 ;2  (1  2)n 1(y))
8 y1 2 (N (B))nf1  2)n(y)g
U2p;q((1  2)n(y);2  (1  2)n(y)) > U2p;q((1  2)n(y); x1)
8 x1 2 (M(A))nf2  (1  2)n(y)g
The last inequality can be written in terms of the operator Q0, as:
U2p;q(Q0n(y);2  Q0n(y)) > U2p;q(Q0n(y); x1)8 x1 2 M(A) (37)
In this case, the corresponding operator Q0, is constructed by the maps 1;2 as
follows,
Q0 = 1  2 (38)
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Hence, a periodic action y of player's B satises:
Q0ny = y (39)
2.2 Mixed Nash Equilibria are Periodic Strategies of 2  2 Strategic
Form Games
In this subsection we investigate the periodicity properties of the mixed Nash equilib-
ria in 2 2 simultaneous strategic form games. The mixed Nash equilibria are treated
somehow dierently than the other mixed strategies. As it will become obvious, the
periodicity of the Nash equilibria is guaranteed without applying the algorithm that the
inequalities (31) and (36) dictate. Actually, as we shall demonstrate, the mixed Nash
equilibria are always periodic, if the players play the Nash strategies. In addition, the
Nash equilibria are the only mixed rationalizable strategies that result to a rationaliz-
ability cycle, like the one we came across to the pure strategies case. This "enforced"
in some way periodicity (in the sense that it is not obtained by direct application of the
algorithm) is very closely connected to the fact that in the case of mixed strategies, the
players mixed strategies have an important property which is the so called \opponents
indierence property". We shall further analyze this in the following.
The procedure of nding the mixed Nash equilibria is based on maximizing each players
expected utility function with respect to the mixed strategy that a player assigns to
his own actions. We use the expression (26) and the conventions of relation (27)
for the probabilities. Hence, the problem of nding mixed Nash strategies reduces
to nding the optimal strategies for players A and B for the various p; q values and
hence maximizing the corresponding expected utilities with respect to (p; q). Let us
analyze rst player's A expected utility maximization procedure. We make the following
assumptions:
 The game is not a trivial game (the payo matrix is not degenerate).
 The terms U1(A1; B1) + U1(A2; B2)  U1(A1; B2)  U1(A2; B1) and U1(A2; B2) 
U1(A1; B2)) are non zero. The same holds for player's B utility function.
Then, the maximization procedure of player A expected utility yields the following
equation:
q =
U1(A2; B2)  U1(A1; B2)
(U1(A1; B1) + U1(A2; B2)  U1(A1; B2)  U1(A2; B1)) (40)
Now, the above equation is obtained if we dierentiate the expected utility U1p;q with
respect to p and equalize it to zero, that is
@U1p;q
@p = 0. The sign of the resulting
expression
@U1p;q
@p strongly depends on the signs of the two terms appearing in the
above list. Since these two are game-dependent, we assume that the result can be cast
in the form q x0 = 0, and x0 is determined by the aforementioned terms. Our results
are not aected by the exact value of x0. Such a solution is guaranteed for games
that have a mixed Nash equilibrium, since it is a well known fact that every game has
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a mixed Nash equilibrium. So when q > x0, the expected utility of player's A is a
monotonically increasing function with respect to p and therefore, the best response
of A to player B playing (q; 1   q) with q > x0, is the action with p = 1. In the case
q < x0, the expected utility of player B is monotonically decreasing with respect to p
and hence, the best response of player A to player B playing (x0; 1  x0), is any action
with 0  p  1. Correspondingly, for player B, the equation to analyze is of the form
p  x00 = 0. If p > x00, the expected utility of player B is monotonically increasing with
respect to q and hence, the best response of player B to player A playing (p; 1   p)
with p > x0 is the action with q = 1. If p < x
0
0, the expected utility of player B is
monotonically decreasing with respect to q and thereby, the best response to player A
playing (p; 1   p) with p < x0 is the action with q = 0. Finally, if p = x00, the best
response to player A playing (x00; 1  x00), is any action with 0  q  1.
Hence, it is easy to see that a simple belief hierarchy can be formed in terms of the Nash
equilibrium action. This simple belief hierarchy is formed by the actions (x0; 1 x0) and
(x00; 1  x00). As we shall see, this by itself can lead to the conclusion that it is always
possible to nd a periodicity cycle for the mixed Nash equilibrium. Take for example
player A: When B plays the Nash strategy (x0; 1   x0), player A can play any of his
available strategies. This is the materialization of the opponent's indierence property.
The same applies for player B, that is, if A plays (x00; 1   x00), then B can play any of
his available actions. Hence, all the actions of A are rationalizable only if B plays his
the Nash strategy and conversely all B's actions are rationalizable only if A plays his
Nash strategy. Nevertheless, only the Nash strategies are contained in the periodicity
cycle. Let us clear this up a little bit more, since it is of particular importance. The
rationality argument for the Nash strategies verbally can go like this:
 A will play any (p; 1  p) if B plays (x0; 1  x0)
 B will play any (q; 1  q) if A plays (x00; 1  x00).
Obviously there can be a repeating pattern only if the periodic actions are the corre-
sponding mixed Nash equilibrium ones, that is:
 A will play and (p; 1   p) if B plays (x0; 1   x0) and B will play (x0; 1   x0)
(which is one of the innitely many of his allowed actions) if A plays (x00; 1  x00)
(recall that B will play any any (q; 1  q) if A plays (x00; 1  x00)) and A will play
(x00; 1  x00) if B plays (x0; 1  x0) and so on ad innitum.
It is obvious that the mixed Nash strategies can form the following periodicity cycle
(we assume for the moment that 0 < p; q < 1, so that no pure strategies are involved
in our framework):
(x00; 1  x00) R ! (x0; 1  x0) R ! (x0; 1  x0) (41)
Consequently, we can nd maps 1 and 2 that act in the following way:
1

(x00; 1  x00)

! (x0; 1  x0); 2

(x0; 1  x0)

! (x00; 1  x00) (42)
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Therefore, we can form operators QM = 21 and Q0M = 12, such that when these
act to the mixed Nash equilibrium x = (x00; 1  x00) 2 (M(A)) and y = (x0; 1  x0)
2 (N (B)), in such a way so that:
QM (x) = x (43)
Q0M (y) = y
Note that the maps 1,2 are articially imposed and have nothing to do with the
inequalities (31) and (36). As a conclusion, it easily follows from relation (43) that (as
in the pure strategy case) the mixed Nash strategies for each player are periodic, with
the periodicity number for each strategy being equal to one, that is n = 1.
Before proceeding to some illustrative examples, we would like to point out once more
that the algorithm implied from the inequalities (31) and (36), does not necessarily
yield the mixed Nash strategy, although the Nash strategy is periodic. This can be true
only in some exceptional cases. It is the dierentiability of the expected utilities with
respect to (p; q) and the specics of the payo matrix that introduce this peculiarity in
the mixed strategies case. We shall analyze this issue further in the next section, after
we present some examples related to the present case.
Let us briey present one very well known game, in order to augment the above ar-
guments, namely the matching pennies game. Note that this game does not have a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The mixed Nash equilibrium is x =
1
2A1 +
1
2A2 and
B1 B2
A1 1,-1 -1,1
A2 -1,1 1,-1
Table 7: The Matching Pennies Game
y =
1
2B1+
1
2B2. If player B plays q = 1=2 then player A can play any p and conversely
if player A plays p = 1=2, then player B can play any of his available actions. When
B plays any action with q > 1=2 then the expected utility of player A is monotonically
increasing with respect to p and hence the optimal strategy for A is p = 1. Moreover
when q < 1=2, the optimal move for player A is p = 0, since in this case the expected
utility of player A is monotonically decreasing with respect to p. A similar analysis can
be done for player B. Note that the best responses of player A for B playing q = 1=2 is
any p. Hence, this is the set of all rationalizable strategies for player A, and likewise
for player B, any q is rationalizable when A plays p = 1=2. It would be useful here, to
examine the rationalizability issues a bit more.
2.3 Rationalizable Mixed Strategies
The result we found for the mixed strategies case is somewhat dierent compared to
the pure strategies case, since the only mixed rationalizable strategies that are at the
same time periodic, are the mixed Nash strategies (considering mixed strategies with
0 < p; q < 1). The other mixed rationalizable strategies do not yield periodic patterns.
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Here we shall formally discuss the issue of rationalizable mixed strategies in a 2  2
simultaneous move game framework.
Let us denote Rpi (G) and R
m
i (G) the pure strategies that are rationalizable and the
mixed strategies that are rationalizable respectively. The set Rpi (G) is a subset of
Rmi (G), that is R
p
i (G)  Rmi (G). The use of mixed strategies does not expand the
rationalizable outcomes of a game. A rationalizable strategy that is a component of a
rationalizable mixed strategy is also rationalizable as a pure strategy [5]. For a nite
strategy space, we have for any player that Rmi (G), R
p
i (G)  Rmi (G)  C(RPi (G)). In
practice, in order to nd the mixed rationalizable actions, that is, to construct Rmi (G)
from Rpi (G), we nd the points in the convex hull of R
p
i (G) for which player's \i"
expected utility is maximized. We denote this set  . The set of mixed strategies is
constructed from the set supp((Rpi )j ), that is, the set of mixed strategies consists of
these strategies that assign positive probabilities the strategy set  . In the 22 games,
the rationalizable strategies are formed by any (p; 1   p) and (q; 1   q), as we already
mentioned earlier. This is because:
Players A utility is maximized for any p 2 (0; 1) for q = x0. Hence, the actions (p; 1 p),
with p 2 (0; 1) are rationalizable for A when B plays (x0; 1  x0). Similarly, regarding
player B, the actions (q; 1 q) are rationalizable for B when A plays the mixed strategy
(x00; 1  x00). It is obvious that the repeating pattern appears only for the mixed Nash
equilibrium in this type of games. Note however that we did not apply the algorithm
of the inequalities (31) and (36), in order to nd the periodic strategies. If we formally
apply the algorithm, the dierentiability of the expected utilities in terms of the mixed
strategy probabilities (p; q) brings about, quantitatively and qualitatively interesting
features of strategic form games, that are, up to date, not explored in the literature.
This is the subject of the next section.
3 The Algorithm in the Case of Mixed Strategies-Special
Attributes of Prisoners Dilemma and Battle of Sexes
2 2 Games-Collective Action Games
Let us briey recall what the inequalities (31) and (36) entail. For player A, the rst
inequality of relation (31) verbally dictates that for a mixed strategy of player A x,
nd the opponent's action which maximizes player's A expected utility. Quantitatively
this is equivalent to maximizing A's expected utility, with respect to the variable q,
which characterizes the mixed strategy of player B. This maximization procedure will
yield an equation that species a specic critical value of p, say pp. So this procedure
actually yields a condition on p and hence the initial x must be equal to:
x = p

pA1 + (1  pp)A2 (44)
So the algorithm works if the initial strategy of player A is the one specied from the
maximization of U1p;q with respect to q. Note that in the context of this procedure,
q remains unspecied, but will be specied in the subsequent steps. Accordingly, the
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second inequality of relation (31) species the value of q, through the maximization
of U2p;q, with respect to p. To make this clear, see that although p is specied to be
pp from the rst step, we search again the action of player A which yields the largest
payo to player B, therefore 21(pp) is again a random mixed strategy characterized
by the variable p. Hence maximizing U2p;q, with respect to p is equivalent to nding
which mixed strategy 21(pp) maximizes the payo of B. Now the last maximization
procedure will specify the value of q, say qp.
Having specied the values of p = pp and q = qp the expected utilities of the players
must obtain their maximum values, for the aforementioned values of the random vari-
able, that is U1pp;q = max and U2p;qp = max. In general, the periodicity arises if qp is
the only value of q that also maximizes U1pp;q. The same applies for pp in U2p;q. This
general case is kind of dicult to deal with, since it depends on the specics of the
payo matrix. But we shall present some games which are really interesting, and have
quantitative attributes that worth to be studied.
Before getting into the details of these games, let us analyze the more general case that
these games belong. One of the most striking features of the Mixed Nash equilibrium
strategy is that if the opponent of a player plays his Nash strategy, then the player
can play any of his available strategies and his payo is maximized. Particularly, if
the opponent plays Nash, then all the strategies of the player are rationalizable. Let
us reverse this way of thinking and search for games in which, if a player plays one of
his available strategies, his payo does not depend on what the opponent plays and
simultaneously his payo is maximized (the opposite situation to that of the Nash
equilibrium case). This can happen only if that strategy, say pp satises:
@U1p;q
@q

p=pp
= 0 (45)
U1pp;q = max

U1p;q

; 8 p; q
and also that U1pp;q is independent of q. The same should hold true for a special value
of q, say qp, for the player B, that is:
@U2p;q
@p

q=qp
= 0 (46)
U2p;qp = max

U2p;q

; 8 p; q
The games that satisfy these requirements are very interesting since the robustness of
the players with respect to the opponents strategies would imply, in an articial way,
the following periodicity cycle:
pp
P ! qp P ! pp (47)
and correspondingly:
qp
P ! pp P ! qp (48)
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The above two relations imply that the strategies pp and qp are periodic with periodicity
number n = 1. Note however that this periodicity is articial and as already mentioned,
stems from the robustness of the players in reference to their opponents actions. This
periodicity is a direct consequence of the algorithm that the inequalities (31) and (36)
imply.
To see which games have the aforementioned behavior, we focus on the general char-
acteristics of the payo matrix. The maximization of U1p;q with respect to q yields the
following condition:
p = p0 =
U1p;q(A2; B2)  U1p;q(A2; B1)
(U1p;q(A1; B1) + U1p;q(A2; B2)  U1p;q(A1; B2)  U1p;q(A2; B1))
(49)
while the maximization with respect to q yields relation (40). Now, we will exploit
the fact that when the opponent plays a mixed Nash equilibrium strategy, the player's
expected utility is independent of his own randomization over his own strategies, and
at the same time, the utility is maximized. Hence, we can built games in such a way
so that the mixed periodic strategies are connected in some way to the mixed Nash
equilibria.
3.1 First Type of Games
Having in the back of our mind the valuable attributes of the mixed Nash equilibria we
require for a game to satisfy the following conditions:
pp = q

N (50)
qp = p

N
where pp and pN are the mixed periodic and mixed Nash equilibrium for player A
and qp and qN are the mixed periodic and mixed Nash equilibrium for player B respec-
tively. Hence, it is obvious how the robustness of the corresponding expected utilities is
achieved. Making use of relations (40) and (49), relations (50) impose some restrictions
on the payo matrices, which are:
U1p;q(A1; B2) = U1p;q(A2; B1); U2p;q(A1; B2) = U2p;q(A2; B1) (51)
Let us illustrate this result by using a very well known game, the Battle of Sexes,
which is Game 1 in the tables below. If we utilize mixed strategies, the mixed Nash
b1 b2
a1 2,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,2
Table 8: Mixed Strategies Game 1
equilibrium for this game is (pN =
2
3 ; q

N =
1
3). If we maximize player's A expected
utility subject to q we get that
@U1p;q
@q =  1 + 3p, hence the mixed periodic strategy
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is pp = 1=3, regardless the value q takes. If we do the same maximization procedure
for player B, we obtain the mixed periodic strategy qp = 2=3. Let us now examine
the expected utilities of the players. The expected utility for player A at the mixed
"periodic" (we shall use the term periodic even though these strategies are not periodic
per se, but result by using the algorithm) strategy pp = 1=3, is equal to:
U1p;q(pp = 1=3; q) =
2
3
(52)
and is independent of q. The same applies for players B utility for qp = 2=3:
U2p;q(p; qp = 2=3) =
2
3
(53)
Now, the expected utility of player A for player B playing his mixed Nash strategy
qN = 1=3, is equal to:
U1p;q(p; qN = 1=3) =
2
3
(54)
and that of player B when A plays mixed Nash pN = 2=3 is:
U1p;q(pN = 2=3; q) =
2
3
(55)
Notice the last two relations that do not depend on any variable and also that the
expected utilities are maximized when the opponent plays mixed Nash. Also notice
that the expected utilities for the mixed periodic strategy take also their maximum
values. In addition, the utilities corresponding to the periodic strategies and to the
mixed Nash equilibria are equal.
The disadvantage of the mixed Nash strategy, in reference to the mixed periodic strat-
egy, is that in order the expected utility is maximized, the opponent has to play Nash.
This fact renders all the strategies of the player rationalizable. However, this does
not happen in the periodic mixed strategy case, where when the player plays his own
periodic mixed strategy, the expected utility is maximized, regardless what the other
player plays.
According to this line of research, notice furthermore that if player A plays for instance
his own Nash mixed strategy pN = 2=3, his expected utility is:
U1p;q(pN = 2=3; q) =
1
3
+ q (56)
Accordingly the expected utility of player B qN = 1=3 is:
U2p;q(p; qN = 1=3) =
4
3
  p (57)
Obviously, the corresponding utilities depend on what the other player plays, and thus
the mixed strategies of each player do not render the corresponding payo robust
to the opponent's strategies. In contrast, the mixed periodic strategies render the
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corresponding payos robust to what the opponent's choose, and in addition maximize
the expected utility functions. This result is very intriguing, since the mixed periodic
strategies we found, namely (pp = 1=3; qp = 2=3) are not rationalizable actions. Each
of the two, is rendered rationalizable only if the opponent plays for some reason the
mixed Nash strategy. Nevertheless, the attribute and most sound feature of the mixed
periodic strategies is that the player who adopts these, always achieves equal or larger
payo in comparison to the mixed Nash payo, regardless what his opponent plays
(bear in mind that we assume 0 < p; q < 1 in order not to fall into inconsistencies).
3.2 Second Type of Games
Another type of games that has similar attributes as the one we just described, satises
the following conditions:
pp = 1  qN (58)
qp = 1  pN
These conditions render the corresponding expected utilities robust in the opponent
strategies. In addition, condition (58) restricts the payo matrices so that the following
conditions are satised:
U1p;q(A1; B1) = U1p;q(A2; B2); U2p;q(A1; B1) = U2p;q(A2; B2) (59)
Let us illustrate this result using Game 2 in the table below. The pure strategy game has
b1 b2
a1 2,5 50,6
a2 3,10 2,5
Table 9: Mixed Strategies Game 2
two Nash equilibria, namely (A1; B2) and (A2; B1), which at the same time are periodic.
If we deploy mixed strategies, the mixed Nash equilibrium is (pN =
5
6 ; q

N =
48
49).
Maximizing player's A expected utility with respect to q, we get that the mixed periodic
strategy is pp = 1=49 (which is what we expected as a result of (58)). Performing the
same maximization procedure for player B, we obtain the mixed periodic strategy
qp = 1=6. Let us now examine the expected utilities of the players. The expected
utility for player A at the mixed periodic strategy pp = 1=49, is equal to:
U1p;q(pp = 1=49; q) =
146
49
(60)
and is independent of q and additionally player's B utility for qp = 1=6:
U2p;q(p; qp = 1=6) =
35
6
(61)
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On the other hand, the expected utility of player A for player B playing his mixed Nash
strategy qN = 48=49, is equal to:
U1p;q(p; qN = 48=49) =
146
49
(62)
and that for player B when A plays mixed Nash pN = 5=6
U1p;q(pN = 5=6; q) =
35
6
(63)
Precisely as in the previous game, the last two relations (the mixed Nash payos)
do not depend on any variable and also the expected utilities are maximized when
the opponent plays his mixed Nash strategy. In addition, the expected utilities for
the mixed periodic strategy take their maximum values, which are equal to the ones
obtained for the Nash strategies. However, if player A plays for instance his own Nash
mixed strategy pN = 5=6, his expected utility equals to:
U1p;q(pN = 5=6; q) =  
239
6
q + 42 (64)
while the expected utility for player B, when he plays qN = 48=49, is equal to,
U2p;q(p; qN = 1=3) =
485  239p
49
(65)
Obviously, the corresponding utilities depend on what the opponent plays in contrast to
the case mixed periodic strategies are chosen, in which case the corresponding payos
are robust to what the opponents play. Moreover, note that in this case too, the
expected utilities for the players playing the mixed periodic strategies, are equal to the
expected utilities of the players when their opponents play the mixed Nash strategy,
just as in the previous game. As a nal example we shall present some games that do
not belong to some of the aforementioned categories of games but worth mentioning,
since when the periodic mixed strategies are played, the expected utilities are higher
than the ones corresponding to the mixed Nash ones. This is very valuable, since we
connect the periodic strategies to the so-called collective action games.
3.3 An Exceptional Type of Games-Collective Action Games{Prisoner
Dilemma Type of Games
Suppose two big oil companies have both entered a new market, which is a country
that just started to produce oil and gas. Both companies extract oil and gas from that
country and they transfer that oil all round the world. But, the transport of the oil
is a very dicult task, since that country is a big island in the Mediterranean sea.
So the companies would need a pipeline in order to transfer the oil faster and more
eciently. The government public policy allows only one pipeline, so both companies
must share the pipeline, when it is constructed. The question is, who is going to fund
the construction of this pipeline. In the end both companies will be beneted from
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the construction, but who is going to undertake the cost of this task? Such games are
inherent to problems of collective action [31]. In these kind of games, the actions that
make better o the players do not belong to the set of best private interest actions of
the players, or more formally, the socially optimal outcome is not automatically the
Nash equilibrium. The collective action games come in three forms, namely, prisoners
dilemma, chicken and assurance games.
The pipeline project has two important characteristics:
 The benets of the game are non excludable
 The benets are non-rival
Such a project appears in the Economic literature under the name \Pure Public Good".
Non excludable means that a player that has not contributed to the project, will be
beneted from the outcomes. Non-rival means that everyone who participates to the
project, has payos which are robust against the participation of other player to the
project. Such a game can be represented in matrix form in Game 3 below, which
we borrowed from the book of Dixit, Skeath and Reiley [31]. It is obvious that the
B1 B2
A1 4,4 -1,6
A2 6,-1 0,0
Table 10: Mixed Strategies Game 3
Nash equilibrium is the strategy (A2; B2). The payos depend on the quality and the
time that it takes to materialize the project. Obviously, the optimal action for both
players is not to participate, no matter what the other player does, that is, to act as a
\free rider". Apparently, the social optimum is achieved when the strategy (A1; B1) is
adopted by both players. The social optimal is always achieved when the total sum of
the players payos is maximized. However, this is strictly a cooperative way of thinking.
Note that, in the context of mixed periodic strategies, we are still working within a
non-cooperative context (we shall say more on this argument in a later section). Let us
analyze the mixed strategies that this game has. For doing that, we relax the constraint
we imposed in the previous sections and we now have 0  p; q; 1. It is not dicult
to see that the mixed Nash equilibrium is also the strategy (A2; B2). The expected
utilities of the two players for p = pN = 0, and q = q

N = 0 are both equal to zero, that
is:
U1p;q(pN = 0; qN = 0) = U2p;q(pN = 0; qN = 0) = 0 (66)
Applying the algorithm of periodic strategies, we maximize the expected utility of
player A with respect to q and the utility of player B with respect to p respectively.
The results are the periodic mixed strategies, which in this case are the pure strategies
pp = 1 and qp = 1. The expected utilities of both players are maximized for this
periodic strategy, that is:
U1p;q(pp = 1; qp = 1) = U2p;q(pp = 1; qp = 1) = 4 (67)
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Hence, in this case, the social optimum strategy is encompassed to periodic strategies.
But more importantly, we used a non-cooperative method in terms of a self maxi-
mization procedure. The fact that the two outcomes, that is, non-cooperative and
cooperative ones, coincide is an artifact of the details of the game. In the next subsec-
tion we shall discuss this crucial dierence in detail. This a very sound result, since this
outcome is based on a formal procedure of maximization of each player's expected util-
ity with respect to the opponent's mixed strategy. We will further analyze this result
exploiting another useful example. Take for example the following game 2, which is a
collective action game again. If we use mixed strategies, the mixed Nash equilibrium for
b1 b2
a1 0,0 6,1
a2 1,6 3,3
Table 11: Mixed Strategies Game 2
this game is pN =
3
4 ; q

N =
3
4 . Now if we maximize player's A expected utility subject
to q we get that @U1@q =  2 < 0 8 q. Hence, the expected utility is maximized when
q = qp = 0, since the utility is monotonically decreasing, with respect to q. Correspond-
ingly, maximizing player's B expected utility with respect to p we get @U2@p =  2 < 0 8
p. For the same reason, player's B expected utility is maximized when pp = 0. There-
fore, the periodic strategies are pp = 0; qp = 0. A remarkable feature of the periodic
strategy is that U2(pp = 0; qp = 0) = 3 and U1(pp = 0; qp = 0) = 3 while for the Nash
strategies we get U1(qN = 3=4; pN = 3=4) = 2:25 and U2(qN = 3=4; pN = 3=4) = 2:25.
Hence, the periodic mixed strategy (which is actually a pure strategy) yields higher
payos for both players, in terms of their expected utility function, in comparison to
the mixed Nash strategy. This is particularly interesting, since it is in the spirit of
collective action games. Thereby, the procedure of nding periodic mixed strategies
via the maximization of the expected utilities with respect to the opponent's mixed
strategies, could serve as a formal proof why the socially optimal strategies should be
played by the players, but always remaining in a non-cooperative context.
It is natural to ask whether some sort of cooperativity is hidden in the algorithm of
periodic actions. This however is not true, since each player maximizes his own utility
and does not care (in payo terms) for his opponent. This conceptually delicate issue,
is addressed in the following subsection.
3.4 Dierence of Periodicity and Cooperativity
While considering the concept of periodicity in the context of mixed strategies, a rea-
sonable question springs to mind, which has to do with the cooperativity of the periodic
strategies algorithm. Particularly, does the periodicity algorithm entails any kind of
cooperativity among players, so that they result playing the strategies that benets the
most, both of them? The answer in no. As we shall demonstrate, the periodic actions
and also those that result from the periodicity algorithm, are always calculated in a
non-cooperative context.
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Cooperative game theory does not necessarily imply that each agent is agreeable and
will follow instructions. Rather it means that the basic modeling unit is the group
and not the individual agent. Hence, in cooperative game theory the focus is on what
groups of agents, rather than individual agents can achieve. In addition, the payos
may be freely redistributed among it's members. This assumption is satised whenever
there is a universal currency that is used for exchange among players, and means that
each coalition between players can be assigned a single value as it's payo. Moreover, in
cooperative game theory, players are allowed to make binding commitments, as opposed
to non-cooperative game theory, in which they cannot. In addition, in cooperative
game theory, agents are allowed to split the gains from cooperation, by making side
payments between the players that form a coalition. Side payments means transfers
between themselves, which consequently modify the nal payos.
On the contrary, in non-cooperative game theory each player maximizes his own pay-
o, and no side payments are allowed. The payos that each player receives are not
modied for any reason, and remain the same all the time (at least in the simulta-
neous, static, perfect information games we are studying in this article). This is in
the antipode of what is materialized in cooperative game theory. Furthermore, the
real dierence between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory is in the dier-
ent modeling approach and the dierent solutions that are given to each case. For
non-cooperative game theory, the important ingredient is the single agent and for co-
operative game theory the group. As we explicitly showed in the previous sections, the
periodic actions of a player \I", both in pure strategies and mixed strategies (the latter
as outcomes of the periodicity algorithm and not periodic in the sense of section 1),
are found by maximizing the player's I expected utility with respect to his opponents
actions. This does not entail any sort of cooperativity, since what is actually done for a
player, is a self maximization of his utility function. Each player acts non-cooperatively,
since he does not care about their opponents payos but they care about their opponents
actions and particularly they take into account those for which their own payo is max-
imized. This is dierent in spirit from the Nash equilibrium concept, and also from
conventional approaches in non-cooperative game theory, but it is within the context
of non-cooperative game theory.
In order to further support our argument, we shall briey present one of the most rened
cooperative game theory technique, the so called Cooperative-Competitive (CO-CO)
solution concept [32] and we shall compare the results of this solution concept with the
ones that result from the periodic strategies algorithm.
3.4.1 Cooperative-Competitive Equilibrium
We shall briey present the cooperative game theory solution concept, known as Cooperative-
Competitive solution, which was rstly introduced by [32] (see also [33]). Consider a
general, two player non-zero sum game with players A and B, described by the payo
functions A and B, with:
A :M(A)M(B)! <; b :M(A)M(B)! < (68)
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with the strategy spacesM(A) andM(B) being compact metric spaces, and the payo
functions being continuous functions from M(A)M(B) into <. If cooperativity and
communication between players is allowed, the players A and B can adopt a set of
strategies (a]; b]) which maximizes their combined payos,
V ] = A(a]; b]) + B(a]; b]) = maxa;b2M(A)M(B)
h
A(a; b) + B(a; b)
i
(69)
The choice of the strategy (a]; b]), may favor more one player than the other. In such
a case, the player that is better o, must provide some incentive to the other player,
in order that he complies with the strategy (a]; b]). This incentive is actually a side
payment. Splitting the total payo, V ] in two equal parts will not be acceptable,
because this does not reect the relative strength of the players and their personal
contributions to their cooperativity outcomes [33]. A more realistic approach was
introduced by [32] which we now demonstrate. Dene the following games:
](a; b) =
A(a; b) + B(a; b)
2
; S(a; b) =
A(a; b)  B(a; b)
2
(70)
The above two relations actually imply that the original game, is split in two games, a
purely cooperative, with payo ](a; b), and a competitive (which is a zero sum game),
with payo S(a; b). In the cooperative game, the players have exactly equal payos,
that is, they both receive ](a; b), while in the purely competitive part, the players
have exactly opposite payos, namely S(a; b) and  S(a; b).
Denote with V S , the value of the zero-sum game, with utility function S(a; b).
Having found the value of the game, the Cooperative-Competitive value of the game is
dened to be the pair of the following payos:
(
V ]
2
+ V S ;
V ]
2
  V S) (71)
The Cooperative-Competitive solution of the game, is dened to be the pair of strategies
(a]; b]), together with a side payment PS from player B to player A, such that:
A(a]; b]) + PS = V
]
2
+ V S (72)
B(a]; b]) PS = V
]
2
  V S
Obviously, the side payment can be negative, in which case player A pays player B the
amount PS .
Conceptually, the Cooperative-Competitive solution lies in the antipode of the algo-
rithm that yields periodic strategies, owing to the fact that the Cooperative-Competitive
solution, namely the strategy pair (a]; b]), is determined by maximizing the sum of the
player's and his opponent's utility. The periodic strategies on the other hand are com-
puted by maximizing each player's own payo, with respect to the opponent's actions.
In order to further support our arguments in a quantitative way, we shall present some
characteristic examples, and we will compare the Cooperative-Competitive solution and
the periodic algorithm solution.
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Cooperative-Competitive Solution and Periodicity Algorithm{Some Exam-
ples
Consider the Battle of Sexes game that appears in Table 8, in the previous section.
As we demonstrated, for this game both the pure strategy pairs (a1; b1) and (a2; b2)
are periodic strategies. Moreover, when we apply the periodic strategies algorithm to
mixed strategies, we obtain a mixed strategy that yields the same payos as the mixed
Nash equilibrium, with the dierence that each player's payo does not depend on his
opponent's actions. Let us recall for convenience the results here:
The mixed Nash equilibrium for this game is (pN =
2
3 ; q

N =
1
3) and moreover, the
application of the periodic strategies algorithm yields the strategy, (pp = 1=3; qp = 2=3).
The expected utilities of the players are:
U1p;q(pp = 1=3; q) =
2
3
; (73)
U2p;q(p; qp = 2=3) =
2
3
;
U1p;q(p; qN = 1=3) =
2
3
;
U1p;q(pN = 2=3; q) =
2
3
Hence, the payo corresponding to the mixed Nash equilibrium is (U1N ;U2N ) = (2=3; 2=3)
and the algorithm of periodic strategies yields the payos, (U1P ;U2P ) = (2=3; 2=3). Let
us now turn our focus to the Cooperative-Competitive solution of the Battle of Sexes
game. Following the procedure we described in the previous subsection, we nd that
the zero-sum game of the Battle of Sexes game is equal to (Table 12): We easily com-
b1 b2
a1 1/2 0
a2 0 -1/2
Table 12: Game 4, Battle of Sexes
pute the values V ] and V S , which are equal to V ] = 3 and V S = 0. It is obvious that
the Cooperative-Competitive strategy is constituted from any of the two strategy sets
(a1; b1) or (a2; b2). Within the Cooperative-Competitive solution, player B must make
a side payment PS = 1 to player A. Hence, in the Cooperative-Competitive solution
they nal utilities are (U1CC ;U2CC) = (2; 2). As we can see, when players cooperate,
they receive a higher payo, in reference to all other non-cooperative payos we pre-
sented for this game. Consequently, the strategies that are obtained from the periodic
strategies algorithm are, in expected utility terms, as non-cooperative as the mixed
Nash equilibrium.
Let us give another example at this point, to further support the non-cooperativity of
the mixed and non-mixed periodic strategies. Consider the game that appears in Table
30
9. As we demonstrated, the payos corresponding to the mixed Nash equilibrium
(pN =
5
6 ; q

N =
48
49) and the ones corresponding to the periodic strategies algorithm
(pp = 1=49; qp =
48
49) are:
U1P (pp = 1=49; q) =
146
49
(74)
U2P (p; qp = 1=6) =
35
6
U1N (p; qN = 48=49) =
146
49
U1N (pN = 5=6; q) =
35
6
The strategy (a1; b2) corresponds to the Cooperative-Competitive strategy. The values
V ] and V S , are equal to V ] = 56 and V S =  32 , and hence the side payment of player
A to player B is PS =  472 . The Cooperative-Competitive value of the game (the nal
payos of the two players) is (U1CC ;U2CC) = (532 ; 592 ). By comparing the cooperative
payos with the non-cooperative ones, appearing in equation (74), it is obvious that the
non-cooperative ones are by far smaller in comparison to the cooperative ones. In con-
clusion, we have established that both conceptually and quantitatively, the strategies
that result after applying the periodic strategies algorithm, are non-cooperative.
Nevertheless, for some games, the Cooperative-Competitive strategies payo (value in
the terminology of Cooperative-Competitive equilibria) may coincide with the periodic
mixed or pure strategies payo. As it is suspected, this result is accidental and actually
is an artifact of the form of the game. A class of games for which this coincidence occurs,
is the Prisoner-Dilemma games. Consider for example, the game that appears in Table
10. For this example the application of the periodic strategies results to the strategy
pair (A1; B1), with payos (U1P ;U2P ) = (4; 4). For this game the values V ] and V S ,
are equal to V ] = 8 and V S = 0, and side payment of player A to player B is PS = 0.
Consequently, the Cooperative-Competitive value of the game is (U1CC ;U2CC) = (4; 4),
which is the same as the periodic one. However, this is accidental and is an artifact of
the details of the payo matrix.
4 Two player Simultaneous Move Strategic Form Games
with a Continuum Set of Strategies
In this section, we shall study the implications of the periodic strategies algorithm to the
case of two player games with continuous strategies for the players. We shall mainly
focus our interest to strategic form, simultaneous, symmetric games with quadratic
payos. There exist many examples from the economics literature that belong to this
class of games, such as the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly, provision of public good
and search games [34]. A natural question that springs to mind is if there are similar
results in this case, as in the collective action nite games. As we shall see, the periodic
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strategies algorithm does not yield as interesting results as it does in the collective
action games, but we shall present it in order to present all possible applications of the
algorithm.
We consider a game with two players I = 1; 2, for which a continuum set of strategies
is available for each player. The payos are in general of the following form:
u1(x; y) = a1x+ a2y + a3xy + a4x
2 + a5y
2 (75)
u2(x; y) = b1x+ b2y + b3xy + b4x
2 + b5y
2
where x; y 2 <+. In both cases, the parameters a5; b5 are assumed to be negative, in
order the payos are concave in their own strategy. We shall also restrict the parameters
(ai; bi) to be equal, therefore assuming a symmetric game. In order to nd the Nash
equilibria of the above game, the following equations must be solved simultaneously :
@u1
@x
= 0;
@u2
@y
= 0 (76)
Thus, maximizing the payos of each player, with respect to his own strategy, yields
the Nash equilibria. On the antipode of this technique, lies the algorithm of nding the
periodic strategies, in which, the payos of each player are maximized with respect to
their opponents strategies. For the case at hand, this amounts to solving simultaneously
the following two equations:
@u1
@y
= 0;
@u2
@x
= 0 (77)
In order we have maxima at the critical points of equations (76), which we denote
(xN ; yN ), the following two conditions have to be satised:
D1 =
@2u1
@x2
@2u1
@y2
  @
2u1
@y@x
> 0 (78)
@2u1
@x2
jxN ;yN < 0
and simultaneously,
D2 =
@2u2
@x2
@2u2
@y2
  @
2u2
@y@x
> 0 (79)
@2u2
@x2
jxN ;yN < 0
In the case of general quadratic games, the above conditions become:
D1 =  a23 + 4a4a5 > 0; a4 < 0 (80)
D2 =  b23 + 4b4b5 > 0; b4 < 0
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Following the same line of argument, the conditions for maxima, in the case of the
periodic strategies algorithm (for simplicity, we shall call these periodic strategies,
although these are not periodic in the strict sense) are the following two:
D1 =  a23 + 4a4a5 > 0; a5 < 0 (81)
D2 =  b23 + 4b4b5 > 0; b5 < 0
Apparently, in the case of symmetric games, the conditions are very much simplied
to:
D1 =  a23 + 4a4a5 > 0; a4 < 0; a5 < 0 (82)
The latter two conditions are satised for all the cases of quadratic games, owing to
the convexity condition we imposed at the beginning. The Nash equilibria and the
\periodic" points are:
x =   2a1b5   a3b2 a3b3 + 4a4b5 ; y =  
 2a4b2   a1b3
 a3b3 + 4a4b5 ; Nash (83)
x =   2a5b1 + a2b3
a3b3   4a5b4 ; y =  
a3b1   2a2b4
a3b3   4a5b4 ; Periodic
For simplicity, we shall apply the above in specic games and by means of two char-
acteristic examples, we provide some intuition for our results. We shall consider two
continuous, symmetric quadratic games, the \Cournot Duopoly" game and the \Pro-
vision of Public Good" game.
Cournot Duopoly
The Cournot duopoly quadratic game has the following form:
u1(x; y) = (P  A(x+ y))x  (Bx Mx2); (84)
u2(x; y) = (P  A(x+ y))y   (By  My2)
where, using the notation of relation (75) (and also that in the case at hand ai = bi)
the parameters A;B; P;M are dened to be:
a1 = P  B; a3 =  A; a4 =  A+M; a2 = a5 = 0: (85)
The equilibria for this game can be found if we maximize each player's utility function,
with respect to his own strategy. The critical point of the above utilities are:
x =   B   P
3A  2M ; y
 =   B   P
3A  2M (86)
with the corresponding utilities:
u1(x
; y) =
(B   P )

(2A M)(B   P ) +A(3A M)x

(3A  2M)2 (87)
u2(x; y
) =
(B   P )

(2A M)(B   P ) +A(3A M)y

(3A  2M)2
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Let us discuss at this point, the periodicity of the continuous equilibrium (x; y). As
it obvious from the above equation, the equilibrium is not a periodic strategy, in the
sense of inequalities (31). Indeed, as it can be seen, player A will play his equilibrium
strategy, if player B plays as large as possible y and not his equilibrium strategy,
provided that 3A  2M is positive. Accordingly, the same applies for player B. In any
case, there is no direct connection of the equilibrium strategy with periodicity, unless
more conditions are imposed. This is kind of a strange result and must be a result of
the specics of the utilities of the two players. In addition, it can be a consequence
of the fact that the equilibrium is not actually a maximum of the utilities, but rather
is a saddle point. This behavior seems to be inherent to symmetric quadratic games,
since the same thing applies to Public Good games. Let us proceed, to nd what is the
result of the algorithm of periodic strategies. Maximizing each player's utility function,
with respect to his opponent's action, yields the \periodic" strategy, (xp; yp) = (0; 0).
As we can see, this result is not sound enough, to further study it. On the contrary, as
we shall see in the case of Provision of Public Good games, the \periodic" strategies
enjoy an elevated role, in comparison to the present example.
Provision of Public Good Games
The Provision of Public Good quadratic game has the following form:
u1(x; y) = A(x+ y)  Cx B(x+ y)2; (88)
u2(x; y) = A(x+ y)  Cy  B(x+ y)2
The Nash equilibria for this game can be found if we maximize each player's utility
function, with respect to his own strategy. The critical point of the above utilities are
strategies that simultaneously satisfy:
x + y =
A  C
2B
(89)
with the corresponding utilities:
u1(x
; y) =
(A  C)2
4B
+ Cy (90)
u2(x; y
) =
(A  C)2
4B
+ Cx
As we can see, no periodicity arguments can be applied in this case, exactly for the
same reasons as in the Cournot duopoly game. Let us proceed to the periodic algorithm
strategies. Maximizing each player's utility with respect to his opponents strategy, we
obtain the following strategies (xp; yp):
xp + yp =
A
2B
(91)
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with corresponding utilities:
u1(xp; y) =
A2   2AC
4B
+ Cy (92)
u2(x; yp) =
A2   2AC
4B
+ Cx
Note that we can write the above utilities in terms of the utilities corresponding to the
equilibrium utilities (90), namely,
u1(xp; y) = u1(x
; y)  C
2
4B
(93)
u2(x; yp) = u2(x; y
)  C
2
4B
We can see that the periodic strategies algorithm yields smaller payos in comparison
to the ones corresponding to the equilibrium strategies. When C = 0 the payos are
equal, and this is the interesting fact with these games. This however is owing to the
symmetry of the game and consequently no new information can be extracted from
such kind of games.
5 Epistemic Game Theory Framework and Periodic Strate-
gies
In this section, we shall connect the periodicity number \n" appearing in the auto-
morphism Qn we dened earlier, to the number of types needed to describe a two
player simultaneous strategic form game within an epistemic framework. We shall
work assuming a perfect information context. The epistemic game theory formalism
was introduced rstly in the papers of Harsanyi, in order to describe incomplete infor-
mation games [27{29] and thereafter adopted by other authors (see for example [8{10]
and references therein). Our approach mimics the one used in [30] and also the one
adopted from Perea in [26]. In order to render our presentation complete we shall
briey present the appropriate formalism and reasoning.
5.1 Belief Hierarchies in Complete Information Games and Types and
Common Belief in Rationality
Consider a two player game with a set of nite actions available for each player, which
we refer to as player A and player B hereafter. A belief hierarchy for a player A of
the game is constructed from a chain of increasing order beliefs in terms of objective
probabilities as follows [26]:
 A rst order belief is the belief that player A holds for player B actions
 A second order belief is what player A believes that player B believes that player
A will play
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and so on ad innitum. So a k th order belief represents the belief that player A holds
for the (k 1)-th order belief of player B. The belief hierarchies express in general ratio-
nal choices of the players but also the underlying theme is common belief in rationality,
that is, every player believes in his opponent rationality and believes that his opponent
believes that he acts rational and so on. Since belief hierarchies are constructions that
are not easy to be used in practice, we introduce the concept of a type, which encom-
passes all the information that a belief hierarchy contains, but it is a more compact
way to describe these hierarchies.
Before doing that, let us quantify the belief hierarchies in a more formal way, in terms
of topological metric spaces. The rst order belief hierarchy is actually materialized
from all the probabilities distributions over the space of uncertainty a player \i" has
for his opponents. We denote this X1i and according to the above, X
1
i = C i, that is
to say, the uncertainty is the set of the opponents actions. Hence, the set of rst order
beliefs is,
B1i = (X
1
i ) (94)
Following the same lines of argument, the second order space of uncertainty for player
\i" is equal to:
X2i = X
1
i  (j 6=iB1j ) (95)
which encompasses the player's \i" opponents and in addition his opponents rst order
beliefs. The set of all probability distributions over the space X2i is the set of all second
order beliefs, that is B2i = (X
2
i ). Accordingly, continuing this process up to the k-th
order we obtain the k-th order of uncertainty,
Xki = X
k 1
i  (j 6=iBk 1j ) (96)
which embodies the (k  1)-th order space of uncertainty and also the (k  1)-th order
of the opponent's beliefs. Thereby, the set of k-th order beliefs is the set (Xki ). A
belief hierarchy bi for the player \i" is an innite chain of beliefs b
k
i 2 Bki , 8 k, that is:
bi = (b
1
i ; b
2
i ; :::; b
k
i ) (97)
Relation (97) encompasses all the verbal statements appearing in the list above. The
belief hierarchy is assumed to be coherent, which means that the various beliefs which
constitute the belief hierarchy, do not contradict each other, that is, for m > k
mrg(bmi jXk 1i ) = bk 1i (98)
Having dened coherent belief hierarchies, the epistemic framework is constructed using
the denition of an epistemic type which is simply a coherent belief hierarchy for a player
i. A type corresponds to some epistemic model constructed for the game, so let Ti be
the total number of types needed to describe player i. In addition, for every player \i"
and for every ti 2 Ti, the epistemic model species a probability distribution bi(ti) over
the set C i  T i, which represents the set of choice-type of player i's opponent  i.
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The probability distribution bi(ti) stands for the belief that a player i's type ti holds
about player's  i actions and types, so:
bi : Ti ! (T i  C i) (99)
which is true for a two player game. A type of a player \i" embodies a complete belief
hierarchy that corresponds to that player, and plainly spoken, the type is the complete
belief hierarchy. Now a choice ci of player \i" is optimal for player's \i" type ti if it
is optimal for the rst order beliefs that ti holds about the opponents choices. Within
the epistemic game theoretic framework we utilize, we can dene easily common belief
in rationality. Indeed, we say that the type ti believes in the opponents rationality if ti
assigns positive probability to his opponents  i choices types (c i; t i), in which case
c i is optimal for type t i. Having dened the belief in opponents rationality, we dene
the k fold belief in rationality [26]:
 Type ti expresses 1-fold belief in rationality if ti believes in the opponents ratio-
nality
 Type ti expresses 2-fold belief in rationality if ti only assigns positive probability
to his opponent's types that express 1-fold belief in rationality.
 Type ti expresses k-fold belief in rationality if ti assigns positive probability to
opponents types that express (k   1)-fold belief in rationality.
With the above denition, we can dene the concept of common belief in rationality in
terms of types as follows:
Within an epistemic model, a type ti corresponding to player i, expresses common belief
in rationality, if it expresses k fold belief in rationality for every k. In addition, we
can formally dene a \rational choice", when common belief in rationality is assumed
in the game, as follows: A choice of player i, namely ci is rational under common belief
in rationality, if there is some type ti such that:
 Type ti, expresses common belief in rationality
 Choice ci is optimal for this type ti
Our aim is to connect the periodicity number \n" which we dened earlier, to the
number of types that are necessary to describe a simultaneous two player nite action
game. This connection will be done actually using the point rationalizable strategies.
5.2 The Connection of the Periodicity Number to the total Number
of Types of the Epistemic Model
As we have seen in section 2, the rationalizable actions that are also periodic and at
every step satisfy the inequalities (3) and (8), are particularly interesting, since for
these we can connect the total periodicity number \n", to the numbers of types needed
to describe the game with an epistemic model. This relation can be described by the
following theorem:
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Theorem 4. In two player perfect information strategic form games, the number of
types Nti corresponding to the periodic cycle of a rationalizable periodic action is:
Nti = 2n (100)
Proof. For every such action if the periodicity number is \n", it is possible to construct a
periodicity chain with exactly 2n rationalizable actions appearing in that chain. There-
fore what is necessary to prove is that for each action appearing in the rationalizability
chain, there exist at least one type, so the minimum number of types corresponding
to all the actions of the rationalizability chain is 2n. As is proved in [26], in a static
game with nitely many choices for every player, it is always possible to construct an
epistemic model in which,
 Every type expresses common belief in rationality
 Every type assigns for every opponent, probability 1 to one specic choice and
one specic type for that opponent.
Thereby, for two player games, each type for player A for example, assigns probability
1 to one of his opponents actions and one specic type for that action, such that this
action is optimal for his opponent. In addition, in two player games, rationalizable
actions and choices that can be made under common belief in rationality are exactly
the same object. Hence, we can associate to every rationalizable action of player A
exactly one type which in turn assigns probability one to one specic rationalizable
action and one specic type of his opponents types and actions. Moreover, as is proved
in [26], the actions that can rationally be made under common belief in rationality
are rationalizable. To state this more formally, in a static game with nitely many
actions for every player, the choices that can rationally be made under common belief
in rationality are exactly these choices that survive iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. Hence, for two player games, we conclude that strategies which
express common belief in rationality and rationalizable strategies coincide. This is
because all beliefs in two-player games are independent, something that is not always
true in games with more than two players. Therefore, when periodic rationalizable
strategies are considered, the total number of types needed for a rationalizability cycle
is equal to 2n.
A Comment on Simple Belief Hierarchies and Nash Equilibria
Within an epistemic game theory context, a type ti is said to have a simple belief hier-
archy, if ti's belief hierarchy is generated by some combination i of probabilistic beliefs
about the players choices. Plainly spoken, a type has a simple belief hierarchy if it is be-
lieved that his opponents are correct about his beliefs. As is demonstrated and proved
in [26], a simple belief hierarchy, materialized in terms of some probabilistic beliefs i
about players choices, expresses common belief in rationality, i the combination i of
beliefs is itself a Nash equilibrium. The converse is not always true. Hence, using the
theorem above, the number of types needed to describe a simple belief hierarchy for a
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Nash equilibrium is 2. Obviously, if a Nash action is periodic, then n = 1 and applying
relation (100), we nd that the types needed in the periodic Nash case are two.
We have to stress an interesting point, regarding simple belief hierarchies. When con-
sidering two player games, it is proved (see [26], theorem 4.4.3) that a type ti has a
simple belief hierarchy i ti believes that his opponent holds correct beliefs and believes
that his opponent believes that he holds correct beliefs himself. Thus, he believes that
he has no mistake in his prediction about his opponent beliefs, and he believes that for
his opponent too. In higher order beliefs this is not anymore true, and therefore we
could argue that the total number of wrong beliefs of all the two players about each
other beliefs is equal to 2n  1. Plainly spoken, the total number of mistakes that the
two players do is equal 2n   1. Here we call mistakes the beliefs i due to which the
higher order belief hierarchy fails to be simple belief hierarchy.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an intrinsic property of 2-player nite simultaneous strategic form
games, which we called periodicity of strategies. We studied the periodicity concept in
nite action games in which case we proved that every nite action two player strategic
form game has at least one periodic action. Moreover, we proved that the set of periodic
strategies is set stable under the map Q. Nash strategies are not always periodic as
we demonstrated and we found which conditions must be satised in order these are
periodic. As a corollary of these conditions, it follows that the periodicity number
of the periodic Nash strategies is equal to one. Next, we studied the case in which
mixed strategies are taken into account, again in the context of two player nite action
strategic form games. As we demonstrated, the only periodic strategy in the sense
of section 1 is the mixed Nash equilibrium. Applying the algorithm of periodicity to
specic classes of games results in some very interesting outcomes. These are interesting
both in a quantitative and a qualitative way. As we have shown, in both classes of games
that we have presented, the algorithm results in some mixed strategies, which we called
periodic (although these are not periodic in the strict sense of section 1), for which the
payos of the player are equal to the mixed Nash equilibrium, or larger. This strategy
gives outcomes for each player which do not depend on what the opponent will play.
The periodicity in these classes of games is actually a solution concept.
Moreover, the application of the algorithm to collective action games gives another
interesting result. In particular, we were able to evince that the social optimum strategy
can be played by adopting a non-cooperative thinking. The issue of cooperativity
and periodicity was addressed too. As we substantiated, periodic strategies are as
cooperative as the mixed Nash equilibrium, and we demonstrated this in a quantitative
way, by exploiting some characteristic examples. Then we attempted to introduce
an epistemic framework and incorporate periodic strategies in this framework. As
we proved, the number of types needed to describe the rationalizability cycle of a
rationalizable periodic strategy is equal to two times the periodicity number of that
action. The next step of this study certainly would be the inclusion of more than
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two players in the game. Our intention in this paper was to oer a rst close look
at this new concept called periodicity and point out the new quantitative features it
provides. Or course, introducing more than two players will increase the complexity
of the arguments we used. Moreover, the cooperativity issue in games with more than
two players is much more complex than in the case we examined. This is due to the
fact that the players are free to form coalitions. Periodicity then has to be reconsidered
under this perspective. In addition, the periodicity concept should be studied in a
non-perfect information context, such that provided by static or dynamical Bayesian
games with two players.
Clearly, the periodicity feature for nitely many actions of strategic form games can be
very useful. Indeed, all the periodic actions can be found using some simple program
code, a fact that is clearly a good step in nding all the rationalizable actions that are
non- Nash equilibria. This result is actually a common feature of every non-degenerate
nite action game, that is, every non-Nash rationalizable action is usually periodic.
This can be very useful for games that have, as we mentioned, nitely many actions,
since the potential non-Nash rationalizable actions can be determined by nding the
periodic strategies.
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